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Imposing Rules

FREDERICK SCHAUER*

The literature on rules, like the literature on authority, is a literature of
the subjects. Although the practice of rule-based governance requires, at
the least, both a rule-imposer and a rule-subject, it is the rule-subject
who attracts the bulk of our attention, or so one would infer from
looking at the philosophical and jurisprudential literature. Within this
literature, the subjects of rules loom large, with the most concentrated
attention being devoted to exploring the moral, political, and legal
responsibilities of those whose decisions and actions would be constrained
by the rules that others impose upon them.1
Yet although the issues surrounding the morality and rationality of
rule-following are indeed important, the parallel issues of rule-imposition
are no less so. When we examine the morality and rationality of ruleimposition, however, we discover structural differences between the
standpoint2 of the rule-imposer and that of the rule-subject, differences
* Frank Stanton Professor of the First Amendment, John F. Kennedy School of
Government, Harvard University. This Essay is the written version of my remarks to the
Section on Jurisprudence at the Annual Meeting of the Association of American Law
Schools, Atlanta, Georgia, January 4, 2004.
1. See, e.g., HEIDI M. HURD, MORAL COMBAT (1999); JOSEPH RAZ, THE
AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY (1979); PHILIP SOPER, THE ETHICS
OF DEFERENCE: LEARNING FROM LAW’S MORALS (2002); Donald H. Regan, Law’s Halo,
4 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 15 (1986); Scott J. Shapiro, The Difference That Rules Make, in
ANALYZING LAW: NEW ESSAYS IN LEGAL THEORY 33 (Brian Bix ed., 1998).
2. The importance of standpoint in legal theory has been persistently urged by
William Twining. See, e.g., WILLIAM TWINING & DAVID MIERS, HOW TO DO THINGS
WITH RULES 64–74 (3d ed. 1991); WILLIAM TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE
REALIST MOVEMENT 3–4, 172–74, 375–84 (1973).
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that make the morality and rationality of rule-imposition considerably
more divergent from the morality and rationality of rule-following than
is commonly appreciated. It is just that divergence—the divergence
between the perspective of the rule-imposer and the perspective of the
rule-subject—that I seek to explore here.
I.
As I shall emphasize throughout these comments, much of the
literature on obedience to (or disobedience of) rules3 assumes that the
subject’s proposed act is either beneficial or, if not positively beneficial,
then at least harmless, or, if not harmless, then at least harmful only to
the subject herself. Perceived from the standpoint of the subject, the
worst we can imagine of any action is that it is harmful only to the
subject, and the best we can imagine is that the act is somewhere
between morally neutral and morally advantageous. Yet the universe of
human actions is not exhausted by the categories of beneficial, harmless,
and harmful only to the actor. There is still another category, and it is a
highly significant one, for some actions are harmful to others—murder,
rape, assault, price fixing, the sale of tainted foods, and the dumping of
toxic waste, for example—and it is in the realm of such other-regarding
and harmful acts that questions about the morality and rationality of
rule-imposition become important.
With respect to other-regarding and harm-producing actions,4 the
primary question is the question of intervention.5 If Sid perceives Rick
about to commit an assault against Barbara, for example, what should
Sid do? Putting aside Sid’s concerns for his own safety, a moral and
rational Sid should intervene if he perceives it right to protect Barbara
against Rick, but should of course not intervene if he perceives Barbara
as being in no danger—Rick and Barbara might be play-acting for
example. This is obvious, and verges on the tautological, but what is
important about this scenario is that rules need play no part in Sid’s
3. And so too on the obedience to law and the obedience to authority.
4. As should be apparent, I take the category of harm-producing actions to be a
subset of the category of other-regarding actions. Some harm-producing actions are
harmful only to the actor and are thus not other-regarding, and some other-regarding
actions produce consequences for others that are not harmful (such as being beneficial),
but here I concentrate on those actions that produce harm to others. If we think of ruleimposers as “first” parties, and rule-subjects as “second” parties, then what I am
concerned with here are the actions of first parties with respect to the actions of second
parties that have harmful consequences to third parties.
5. For my own earlier thoughts on this question, framed largely in terms of the
justifications for not tolerating the other-regarding and harm-producing the actions of
others, see Frederick Schauer & Richard Zeckhauser, Cheap Tolerance, 9 SYNTHESIS
PHILOSOPHICA 439 (1994).
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decision whether to intervene. Sid should intervene when it is the right
thing to do, but not when it is the wrong thing to do, and rules do not
come into the equation. So if it happens that a rule tells Sid to intervene
when intervention is the right thing to do, then the rule is superfluous,
and if a rule tells Sid to intervene when nonintervention is the right thing
to do, then it is pernicious, and, arguably, ought to be disregarded.6 And
so too in reverse, with rules that would mandate nonintervention when it
is not right to intervene being superfluous, and rules that would mandate
nonintervention when intervention is indicated being perverse. When
we are talking about single acts of intervention or nonintervention,
therefore, rules turn out to be either superfluous or perverse, and it is
thus difficult to perceive their virtues.
II.
Things look dramatically different, however, when we move beyond
single acts of intervention or nonintervention, for here there is an
important asymmetry. Even though a rule will regulate a multiplicity of
events—that is just what rules do,7 and it is what distinguishes rules (or
standing orders) from particularized commands—the subject of the rule
sees only one. From the perspective of the subject, the generality of a
rule disappears, and she sees only a particularized conflict between what
she wishes (rightly, from her perspective) to do (or not to do), and what
the rule indicates with respect to this particular action. And from this
perspective, as Scott Shapiro rightly emphasizes in his remarks here,

6. I do not deny that there may often be good reasons for following rules even
when they indicate wrong actions, for every instance of authority presents just such a
scenario. See LARRY ALEXANDER & EMILY SHERWIN, THE RULE OF RULES: MORALITY,
RULES, AND THE DILEMMAS OF LAW 34–36, 53–59 (2001); Donald H. Regan, Reasons,
Authority, and the Meaning of “Obey”: Further Thoughts on Raz and Obedience to Law,
3 CANADIAN J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE 3, 20 (1990); Donald H. Regan, Authority and
Value: Reflections on Raz’s Morality of Freedom, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 995 (1989). I
assume the absence of authority here because it is the absence of authority from the
subject’s standpoint that makes the problem interesting and hard. If there is a case for
authority from the authority’s point of view even when there is no case for authority
from the subject’s point of view, then there is an a fortiori case for authority from the
authority’s point of view when there is a case for authority from the subject’s point of
view.
7. Understanding rules as necessarily general and thus encompassing a multiplicity of
relevantly different particulars is the central theme of FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY
THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW
AND IN LIFE (1991).
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rules once again are either superfluous or perverse.8
From the perspective of the putative intervener with respect to harmful
action, however, the generality of a rule hardly disappears. If the
putative intervener is considering intervening with respect to a single
action, rules are either superfluous or perverse, but there is no reason to
believe that intervention, unlike obedience or disobedience, must necessarily
be particular rather than general, singular rather than multiple. As a
potential intervener looks out upon the world, she may well see not only
one but rather numerous opportunities for intervention. In theory she
could intervene one intervention at a time, making the intervention or
nonintervention decision on a case-by-case or particularistic basis. But life
is short, resources are scarce, and time is limited. From the perspective
of the intervener the challenge is pressing—so much evil, so little time.
So the intervener often intervenes wholesale rather than retail, deciding
to intervene for a class of cases rather than one case at a time. And of
course we rarely refer to this as wholesale intervention; we simply call it
policymaking. Sometimes we simply call it rulemaking.
III.
The question is now transformed. No longer are we concerned with
whether a rational rule-subject should follow a rule on this occasion, and
no longer are we concerned with whether a rational putative intervener
should intervene on this occasion. Rather, we are concerned with how a
person with power (not the same as authority) rationally intervenes in
multiple other-regarding and harmful events, and thus how such a person
(or institution) exercises control over multiple misbehaving agents. And
because rules are generalizations, with all of the under- and overinclusiveness
that necessarily attaches to rules, the rational intervener imposes rules
even as he recognizes that those rules will in effect mistakenly intervene
on some occasions and mistakenly fail to intervene on others. But in
considering the imposition of rules, the rule-imposer will consider the
issue in the aggregate, and will impose rules whenever she perceives that
the harm she prevents by imposing rules in the area of their accurate
application exceeds the harm she produces by imposing rules in the area
of their inaccurate application.
In imposing rules, therefore, the rational imposer is considering how
she should maximize her control over multiple miscreants, or, to put it
more gently, over multiple potentially misbehaving (to the detriment of
third parties) agents. These agents, when they do not believe that they
8. See generally Scott Shapiro, The Rationality of Rule-Guided Behavior: A
Statement of the Problem, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 55 (2005).

88

SCHAUER

4/7/2005 11:05 AM

Imposing Rules

[VOL. 42: 85, 2005]

SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

are misbehaving, will have reason to disregard the rule, especially if they
make the decision after taking into account the possibility of their own
error. But the rational imposer of the rule may believe, rationally, also
after taking account of the possibility of her own error, that the rulesubjects will underestimate the possibility of their own error, and,
consequently, it may be rational at times for the rational rule-imposer to
act on the belief that rule-subjects will act irrationally. Rule-imposition
becomes rational, therefore, under circumstances in which the ruleimposer believes, rationally, that rule-subjects will act irrationally (or at
least mistakenly), even while those same rule-subjects are acting rationally
in believing, from their lights, that the rule is asking them to act
irrationally.
IV.
All of this may seem like immoral arrogance on the part of the ruleimposer, but to believe that is to miss the point. For if it is not immorally
arrogant for me to think that I as a rule-subject am (beneficially) right
and the rule is (dangerously) wrong—and this is the perspective in
almost all of the literature on authority and on rule-following—then it is
no more immorally arrogant for me to think that as a rule-imposer I am
(beneficially) right and that as a rule-subject you are (dangerously)
wrong. And if it is not immorally arrogant to think that I am right and
that you (singular) are wrong, then it is not immorally arrogant to think
that I am right and you (plural) are wrong. And because life is short and
I have limited cognitive resources, I consequently impose rules simply
as the embodiment of the view that I am right and you (plural) are
wrong.
Thus, even if, for the sake of argument, it is not rational to follow
rules, and even if, for the sake of argument, it is not rational to impose
rules on myself,9 it still can be rational to impose rules on others, and
thus to try to get others to act in ways that they perceive to be irrational,
but erroneously so.10 To put it differently, it is rational for me to try to
9. See Thomas C. Schelling, Enforcing Rules on Oneself, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG.
357 (1985).
10. My argument here is consistent with that in Larry Alexander, The Gap, 14
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 695 (1991) (identifying a gap between the morality of
imposing authority from the standpoint of the authority and the morality of accepting
authority from the standpoint of the subject). See also Larry Alexander & Emily
Sherwin, The Deceptive Nature of Rules, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1191 (1994).
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get you to act in ways that you think, erroneously from my perspective,
are irrational, and, to sharpen the point even further, it is irrational for
me to act otherwise. At the end of the day, after all of the discounting
for the possibility of my own error, it is irrational and hardly arrogant for
me to try to induce you not to behave in ways that I believe that you
mistakenly believe to be rational.
Nor does it help for me to think in terms of your autonomy, for as long
as we are in the realm of harmful other-regarding actions, then your
harm-producing autonomy counts not only for no more than my harmpreventing autonomy, but also for no more than the autonomy of those
third parties whose autonomy will be impaired by your actions. Yes, I
want you to be suspicious of my rules, but no less than I want me to be
suspicious of your suspicion of my rules. And, to put it bluntly, it is
irrational of me to think and behave otherwise. Blind obedience has a
bad odor about it, but I would prefer that you not think than to think
wrongly, and from my perspective I would prefer unthinking avoidance
of harmful behavior than thoughtful engagement in harmful behavior.
My first choice would be that you knowingly do the right thing, but as a
second choice I would rather have you do the right thing unknowingly
than do the wrong thing knowingly. And all of this is in reality no
different from the way you think of me, which is why arrogance drops
out of the equation entirely.
V.
To re-emphasize the point that I urged at the outset of these remarks,
little of this analysis makes any sense if the images we have in mind are
those of smokers, drinkers, dopers, gamblers, wastrels, helmetless motorcycle
riders, seat beltless drivers, midnight desert red light-runners, and all of
the other typical protagonists of the literature on authority and deference.
But if instead we imagine the instances in which the protagonists are
rule-imposers and the rule-subjects are axe murderers, child molesters,
price fixers, drunken drivers, sexual harassers, polluters, defrauders, and
maybe even inside traders, then the issue looks quite different. When
the subjects of rules are potentially dangerous to third parties, it is not
only moral and rational to impose rules, but on frequent occasion it is
immoral and irrational not to.
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